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TORTS. PARENTAL PARTICIPATION IN THE TORTIOUS CONDUCT OF MINOR
CHILDREN.
Califorma courts are fond of reaffirming the common law principle that par-
ents are not vicariously liable for the torts of their minor children.' At the same
time, the courts agree that in certain circumstances the parent may become asso-
ciated with the tort in such a way as to become liable in damages. This can occur
in fact situations where the law of agency can be invoked 2 or where the parent
intentionally participates in the tort.3
Most often, however, the question arises when the injury follows some negli-
gent participation on the part of the parent. This negligent participation may take
one of two forms. The first is negligent participation through active misconduct;
working a positive injury to others by the omission to do something which a reason-
able man would do, or by doing something that a reasonable man would not do.4
The second form of negligent participation is through passive inaction, a failure
to take positive steps to benefit others, or to protect them from harm not created
by any active misconduct of the actor, where by reason of the pre-existing relations
of the parties the law imposes a duty to do so.6 To denote these two categories
which represent approximately the distinction between "misfeasance" and "non-
feasance," this article will use the terms "active misconduct" and "passive
inaction."
Since a parent will be liable prima facie for active misconduct, while liability
for passive inaction will attach only in such cases where the law has raised a duty
to act, the division is an important one to keep in mind. The case of Martin v.
Barrett6 indicates the unfortunate result of a failure to recognize and honor this
distinction.
The complaint in Martin v. Barrett charged that the parents of twelve-year-old
Lawrence Barrett had negligently participated, both by active misconduct and
by passive inaction, in the tortious acts that cost five-year-old Billy Martin the
sight of one eye. Lawrence's parents rented the upstairs apartment of their resi-
dence to Billy's parents and both families shared a common yard. For the charge
of active misconduct, after describing Lawrence as a "careless, reckless and ag-
gressive person" who had "teased, molested and bullied plaintiff Billy and his
brother," the complaint set out that despite Lawrence's immaturity and lack of
judgment, his mother and father "negligently allowed and permitted" Lawrence
to have an air gun. This air gun was the instrument that caused Billy's tragedy
The mother was charged with passive inaction. It was stated that she "negli-
gently permitted" Lawrence to fire the air gun into the common yard although she
knew Billy was playing there.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the District Court of Appeal
affirmed the judgment, holding that no cause of action was set out.
To analyze the reasomng that led to this conclusion it is necessary to consider
I A statement of the prnciple occurs in one form or other in each of the California cases
cited below.
2 Crittenden v. Murphy, 36 Ca]App. 803, 173 Pac. 595 (1918), 20 CAL. JuR. Parent &
Child § 47.
3 Kallenberg v. Long, 68 CalApp. 317, 229 Pac. 57 (1924).
4 PROSSER, TORTS § 32, 19 CAL. JuR. Negligence § 4.
5 HARPER, TORTS § 79; Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basts of Tort Liability,
56 U. or PA. L. REv. 217.
6 120 CalApp.2d 625, 261 P.2d 551 (1953).
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first the 1885 case of Hagerty v. Powers7 In that case a parent had "willfully and
negligently" permitted his eleven-year-old son to have a loaded pistol in his pos-
session, but the Supreme Court of California maintained that the parent "is not
liable in damages for the torts of his child, committed without his knowledge,
consent or sanction, and not in the course of his employment of the child."
The Hagerty case made no mention of the categories of negligent participa-
tion, but their existence was acknowledged by the Supreme Court of California
in 1923 when it decided Buelke v. Levenstadt.8 There the court said, "the common
law rule exempting a parent from liability for the torts of his minor child [is]
joined with the other rule that a parent may become liable for an injury caused
by the child and made possible, and probable, through the parents' negligence."
To complete the outline of liability, the case of Ellis v. D'Angelo9 must be
considered. The facts in that case pitted a babysitter against a four-year-old boy
who was in the habit of violently attacking people. The babysitter suffered frac-
tured bones in both her arms and wrists during her first encounter with the child.
The parents were held liable for their negligent failure to warn the babysitter and
to exercise control over their child.
The case also sets forth the factors which must be present before liability can
attach for harms following passive inaction. In general, the parent must know of
the necessity and opportunity for exercising control, 10 and the necessity can be
shown if the child has demonstrated a propensity toward the particular harmful
conduct."
The conclusions in the Martin case seem to have been developed from the fol-
lowing line of reasoning. In all of the cases within the orbit of the Hagerty and
Buelke cases, there was no finding of active misconduct against the parent who
delivered or countenanced the possession of the instrument that inflicted the harm.
Therefore, the court would not consider "negligently allowing and permitting"
Lawrence to have an air gun to be a source of liability in itself. Disposing of the
charge of active misconduct in this way, the court then referred to the Ellis case
and studied the requirements of liability following passive inaction. Finding no
habitual propensity for Lawrence to misuse the air gun, the court concluded that
no affirmative duty to control Lawrence was imposed on the mother.
These conclusions follow in perfect order and would be entitled to the highest
regard except that it is an error to hold that the Hagerty and Buelke authorities
preclude a finding of active misconduct under the facts of the subject case. In
every applicable case in that body of authority the instrument which the parent
gave or permitted the child to have was useful in nature, familiar to the public in
general and of general utility. It was dangerous only when in the hands of a care-
less or reckless person.2 The instrument in the Martin case was of no social
7 66 Cal. 368, 5 Pac. 622 (1885).
8 190 Cal. 684, 214 Pac. 42 (1923).
9 116 CalApp.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
10 The court cited with approval IESTATEdxMNT, ToRTs § 316.
1 1 The court was influenced by those cases collected in 155 AL.R. 81, which was cited.
12 It must be kept m mind that at the time of the Hagerty case hand guns were in wide
use for purposes of protection. Regard must be had to the era.
Figone v. Gulsti, 43 CalApp. 606, 185 Pac. 694 (1915) revolved a charge of negligently
placing a minor son within reach of a loaded revolver. However, the revolver was at the par-
ent's place of business.
The balance of the cases deal with the use of automobiles. See Perry v. Simone, 197 Cal.
Nov., 1954] NOTES
